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[Crim. No. 10296. In Bank. Nov. 30,1966.] 
In re LOUIS D. PONCE on Habeas Corpus. 
[1] Oriminal Law-Punishment-Double Punishment.-To pre-
clude the possibility that defendant's sentence for robber~· 
might prejudice him in the Adult Authority's fixing of his term 
in connection with a concurrent sentence for kidnaping for the 
purpose of that robbery under Pen. Code, § 209, as the statute 
read at the time of the offenses, the robbery sentence, the 
. lesser of the two, had to be set aside. 
[2] Habeas Oorpus-Grounds for Relief-Adjudication of Habitual 
Oriminality.-In a habeas corpus proceeding involving attacks 
on a judgment imposing concurrent sentences and expressl~' 
adjudging petitioner an habitual criminal, the legal effect of 
the determination of habitual criminality was moot where it 
appeared that the determination made him ineligible for parole 
until he served a minimum nine-year term, that he had served 
the minimum term, had been paroled, and had returned to 
prison under sentence for another crime. 
[3] Oriminal Law~Habitual 01fenders-Proceedings Where Prior 
Conviction Admitted.-In a prosecution for robberies and 
kidnaping for the purpose of robbery, where the information 
also alleged and defendant admitted prior felony convictions of 
[8] See Cal.Jur.2d, Habitual Criminals and Subsequent Offenders, 
§ 31. 
McX. Dig. References: [1] Criminal Law, § 1475; [2] Habeas 
Corpus, § 34(5) (j); [3,4] Criminal Law, § 1469. 
-Retired Associate Justice of the Supreme Court sitting under assign. 
ment by the Chairman of the Judicial Council . 
) 
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assault with a deadly weapon and robbery for which separate 
prison terms were served, he had sufficient notice that the 
charges could lead to a determination that he was an habitual 
criminal without additional express allegations regarding 
habitual criminality or the terms of Pen. Code, § 644. 
[4] ld.-Habitual Offenders-Proceedings Where Prior Conviction 
Admitted.-Defendant was not denied the due process required 
in recidivist proceedings where, during the proceedings befol'e 
imposition of sentence and until 60 days after the commence-
ment of imprisonment (Pen. Code, § 644, subd. (c», defendant 
and his counsel had the opportunity to raise any question as to 
, the legal sufficiency of prior convictions to support the deter-
mination of habitual criminal status and as to circumstances 
that might have led the trial court in its discretion to relieve 
him of that determination, but neither defendant nor his 
counsel availed himself of the opportunity. 
PROCEEDING in habeas corpus to secure release from cus-
tody after judgment of conviction of first degree robberies 
and kidnaping for purpose of robbery. Sentence for one rob-
bery set aside; order to show cause discharged and writ denied. 
Louis D. Ponce, in pro. per., and Marcus Vanderlaan, under 
appointment by the Supreme Court, for Petitioner. 
Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General, Edsel W. Haws, John 
L. Giordano and Daniel J. Kremer, Deputy Attorneys General, 
for Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, C. J.-Petitioner attacks a judgment imposing 
concurrent sentences for two first degree robberies and a 
kidnaping for the purpose of robbery and expressly adjudging 
that petitioner is an habitual criminal who should be punished 
under Penal Code section 644, subdivision (a).1 The judgment 
was affirmed in People v. Ponce (1950) 96 Cal.App.2d 327 
[215 P.2d 75]. 
Petitioner contends and the Attorney General concedes that, 
as established by the undisputed facts recited in People v. 
IThe applicablo part of section 644, unchanged since the rendition of 
the 1949 judgment here attacked, reads: "(a) Every person convicted 
in this State of the crime of robbery . . . [or] kidnaping ..• who shall 
have been previously twice convicted upon charges separately brought 
and trieu, and who sllan have served separate tenns therefor in any state 
prison ... of the crime of robbery . . . [or] felonious assault with a 
deadly weapon ... shall be adjudged a habitual criminal and shall be 
punished by impl"isollment in the state prison for life." 
) 
) 
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Ponce, su.pra,2 Penal Code section 6543 precludes puuishing 
petitioner for both the robbery and the kidnaping of Louis 
Pitzel. (Neal v. State of Califm·nia (1960) 55 Ca1.2d 11, 19 [9 
Cal,Rptr. 607,357 P.2d 839].) [1] As in People v. Knowles 
(1950) 35 Ca1.2d 175, 180, 186, 189 [217 P.2d 1], criminal 
conduct in connection with the robbery constituted kidnaping 
for the purpose of robbery under Penal Code section 209 [IS 
that statute read at the time of the offenses. Since the punish-
ment for such kidnaping (life imprisonment with possibility 
of parole) is greater than that for first degree robbery 
(imprisonment for not less than five years; Pen. Code, § 213) 
the robbery sentence must be set aside to preclude the possi-
bility that the sentence might prejudice petitioner in the 
Adult Authority's fixing of his term. (In re Ward (1966) 64 
Cal.2d 672, 676 [51 Cal.Rptr. 272, 414 P.2d 400] ; People v. 
McFarland (1962) 58 Ca1.2d 748, 763 [26 Cal.Hptr. 473, 376 
P.2d 449].) 
[2] The legal effect of the determination o'f habitual crimi-
nality is moot. That determination made petitioner ineligible 
for parole until he had served a minimum term of nine years. 
(Pen. Code, § 3047.5.) Petitioner served that minimum 
commencing in 1950 and has since been p.aroled and returned 
to prison under sentence for another crime. 
Regardless of their timeliness, petitioner's attacks on the 
determination of habitual criminality are groundless. He 
contends that he was denied the reasonable notice and oppor-
tunity to be heard that due process requires in recidivist 
proceedings. (Oyler v. Boles (1962) 368 U.S. 448, 452 [7 
L.Ed.2d 446, 82 S.Ct. 501].) [3] The information alleged 
and petitioner admitted that in 1930 he had been convicted of 
the felony of assault with a deadly weapon and served a term 
in the state prison for that offense and that in 1940 he had 
been convicted of the felony of robbery and served a term in 
the state prison for that crime. The accusatory pleading thus 
gave petitioner notice that' he was charged with having 
suffered prior convictions that could lead to a determination 
that he was an habitual criminal. This notice was sufficient 
2Petitioner and two confederates held up Pitzel's cafe. A confederate 
took money from Pitzel at gunpoint, then forced. him to move 60 feet 
trom the bar to an office and 40 more feet from the office to the restroom. 
Meanwhile petitioner at gunpoint had forced the customers and employees 
into the l'estroom. There petitioner took money from Addis, a customer. 
8Penal Code section 654: "An act or omission which is made punish-
able in diffel'ent ways by different provisions of this code may be pun-
ished under either of such provisions, but in no ease can it be punished 
under more than one. • • ." 
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without additional express allegations regarding habitual 
criminality or the terms of section 644. (People v. Dunlop 
(1951) 102 Cal.App.2d 314, 316 [227 P.2d 281] ; In re Mead 
(1949) 92 Cal.App.2d 536, 538 [206 P.2d 1091] ; see also Peo-
ple v. Jackson (1950) 36 Ca1.2d 281, 287 [223 P.2d 236] ; In re 
Gilliam (1945) 26 Ca1.2d 860,866 [161 P.2d 793].) 
[4] During the proceedings before imposition of sentence 
and until 60 days after the commencement of imprisonment 
(Pen. Code, § 644, subd. (c» 4 petitioner and his counsel had 
the opportunity to raise any question as to the legal sufficiency 
of the prior convictions to support the determination of 
habitual criminal status and as to circumstances that might 
have led the trial court in its discretion to relieve petitioner of 
that determination. They did not seek to avail themselves of 
the opportunity and therefore were not denied it. (Oyler v. 
Boles, supra, 368 U.S. 448, 454.) 
Petitioner contends that the determination of habitual 
criminality is defective on the ground that at the trial it was 
not alleged or established that he served separate terms for the 
two prior convictions as required by Penal Code section 644. 
(See People v. Oollins (1964) 228 Cal.App.2d 460, 465 [39 
Cal.Rptr. 595]; People v. Shaw (1965) 237 Cal.App.2d 606, 
616 [47·Cal.Rptr. 96].) Authenticated records now before us, 
however, show that he completed and was discharged from his 
1930 sentence before he suffered his 1940 conviction. (See In re 
Wolfson (1947) 30 Cal.2d 20, 26 [180 P.2d 326]; In re Gardo 
(1952) 108 Cal.App.2d 615, 616 [239 P.2d 77]; People v. 
Shaw, supra, 237 Cal.App.2d 606, 616.) 
The sentence for the robbery of Pitzel is set aside and the 
Adult Authority is directed to exclude that purported sen-
tence from its consideration in fixing petitioner's term. Peti-
tioner is not entitled to release, however, for he is held under 
other valid judgments of conviction. The order to show cause 
is discharged and the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is 
denied. 
McComb, J., Peters, J., Tobriner, J., Peek, J., Mosk, J., and 
Burke, J., concurred. 
Petitioner ~s application for a rehearing was denied Decem-
ber 28, 1966. 
4Pcnal Code seetion 644: "(e) Provided, however, that in exceptional 
cases, at any time not later than 60 days after the actual commencement 
of imprisonment, the court may, in its discretion, provide that the defend-
ant is not an habitual criminal, and in such case the defendant shall not 
be subject to the provisions of this section or of Sections 304:7 and 3048 
ot thi8 ~ode (Iimitin~ eligibility of habitual criminal8 for par()le]." 
